Stagnation and Decay in sub?Saharan Africa: Dialogues, Dialectics and Doubts by Allison, Caroline & Green, Reginald
Stagnation and Decay in sub-Saharan Africa: Dialogues, Dialectics and
Doubts
Caroline Allison and Reginald Green
fragments of our lost kingdom...
Here the stone images
Are raised, here they receive
The supplication of a dead man's hand
Under the twinkle of a fading star.
T. S. Eliot, The Hollow Men
Output per person rose more slowly in sub-
Saharan Africa than in any other part of the world,
particularly in the 1970s, and it rose more slowly in
the 1970s than in the 1960s . . . The tragedy of this
slow growth in the African setting is that incomes
are so low and access to basic services so limited...
Now, against a backdrop of global economic
recession, the outlook for all less-developed
nations - but especially for the sub-Saharan
region - is grim.
Accelerated Development in sub-S aharan Africa
[World Bank 1981: 3,4]
Shape without form, shade without colour,
Paralysed force, gesture without motion;
What are the roots that clutch, what branches grow
Out of this stony rubbish?
T. S. Eliot, The Hollow Men/Gerontion
Request to Report: Genesis of an Agenda
Accelerated Development in sub-Saharan Africa: an
Agenda for Action [World Bank 1981] was born in
response to a 1979 Request of the African Governors
of the World Bank for a review of the cause and
potential cures for the dim economic prospects which
they believed confronted their economies. It appeared
in the autumn of 1981 s the first comprehensive
ideological and programmatic manifesto setting out
the post-McNamara Bank's response to lagging
development (in many cases distintegration), in the
context of rising global economic disorder and
deepening industrial economy recession.
The African official response has been mixed:
welcoming calls for more aid, but politely querying
whether outside expert advice was always part of the
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solution rather than the problem; agreeing on the
dismal record of the late l970s, but wondering
whether it was not both less uniformly gloomy and
more the result of external shocks than the Report
suggests; agreeing on the need to put higher priority on
raising production and exports, but expressing some
scepticism about the rather simple market forces,
private sector, export led model of the Agenda.
Privately, many have been more sharply critical: 'we
asked for bread and they threw a stone at us' was the
sad reflection of a senior economic analyst of a
relatively conservative African state with a good 1970s
performance record.
Some Issues of Presentation and of Principle
Several characteristics of the Report may help to
explain this response. First, its style is both ex cathedra
and minatory. No signs of self-doubt as to the wisdom
of the analysis and prescription presented intrude on
the reader (even when they contain apparent major
inconsistencies). Further, there is a clear implication
that the Bank will only support programmes in sub-
Saharan African (S SA) states which adopt its Agenda,
and will seek to coordinate bilateral donors to do
likewise. The Bank does itself and its audience less
than justice. In face to face discussion and dialogue
(and in internal debates) Bank personnel show far
more uncertainty and doubt, and display greater
realisation that actual decisions are among complex,
imperfect choices with, at best, a moderately wide
range of possible outcomes. Furthermore, at least in
the past, Bank flexibility in adapting projects and
programmes to actual contexts, and 'pure' economic
calculations to political economic realities has been
real, if uneven. Its potential for mobilïsing other
agencies has been used as a carrot rather than a stick.
Second, the analysis and prescription of the Report are
riddled with .rather sweeping generalisations and
inconsistencies. This is partly the result of the normal
operation of an institutional committee's editing of an
outside consultant's draft.' Professor Eliott Berg, the
main consultant, has a more rigorous free competitive
market force, comparative advantage led, neo-liberal
political economic world-view than that reflected in
the final report. While one may suspect that some of
the changes were made by softening proposals, the
majority appear to have taken the form of additions
based on existing Bank commitments (eg food
production, manpower development, population
planning) even when these seem to contradict the main
thrust of the Agenda. Second, the Bank's typical style
of using gençral background analysis, broad principles
and thumbnail case sketches to arrive at concrete
policy proposals lacks any clear articulation from
background analysis up to the general principles, or
down from them to the policy proposals.2 This can
raise difficulties of overgeneralisation, not quite fitting
any actual case, and is so lacking in logical rigour as to
give maximum room for initial premises to be backed
by selective use of evidence, and then deployed directly
to back the writers' own preferred lines of action
without serious analysis of practicability or prudence.
Third, no reader of Agenda is likely to suspect the
Bank of ever having made any mistakes other than
those based on inaccurate technical data inputs or
misplaced faith in the rationality and expertise of
recipient governments. Yet - to cite two examples -
in calling for highway project analysis and support to
include maintenance costs (pp 106, 126) and in
avoiding the creation of parallel, autonomous, expert
staffed administrative and policy units outside the
domestic decision-taking structure [pp 130, 132] the
Bank is reversing its own 1970s advice with a
vengeance.3 This is damaging on two counts: to admit
to analyse - as well as to reverse - past mistakes is
often a necessary first step toward avoiding future
ones; to avoid all responsibility for the results of
policies and projects in which one is directly
implicated not only undermines the credibility of new
proposals, it generates animosity on the part of those
who know their case histories, which impedes rational
consideration of any proposals. Learning and
convincing others both require overt recognition of
One co-author has experienced this process from both sides - in
academia and government and as a consultant to international
agencies. It has its virtues, but achieving rigorous analysis, clear
priorities or total internal consistency are rarely among them.
2i is in part inevitable in attempting to work from concrete
analysis to organising principles and back to concrete proposals for
a large number of cases with severe space constraints. It is
exacerbated by the Bank's desire to avoid any serious analysis of the
nature of and distinct divergencies among African states - a desire
which is understandable, but leaves the political and the concrete
out of political economy in a'way which Smith, Ricardo and Mill
would have found as unsatisfactory as Marx and Lenin.
One co-author has been in several country negotiations on the Bank
precisely on these issues. On at least one occasion - wrongly he now
believes - he in facs was a proponent of the creation of parallel
policy administrations.
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fallibility.4 Similarly, to criticise decisions ex ante is
not always the best way to understand how they came
to be made, and how to avoid similar types of 'good ex
ante'I'bad ex post' choices today. The prospects for
the world economy in the 1970s always differed (to
OECD states as much as to African) from the way
events actually turned out. Choices apparently based
on optimism tempered by prudence have in the event
often proved very wasteful indeed. With the greater
uncertainty - as well as poorer ex ante projections
- surrounding the world economy's evolution in the
1980s, this lesson, on the costs of being 'certain',
deserves careful reflection in terms of its implications
for action.
Fourth, while certain modifications are made in the
direction of human investment and basic services (but
with user charges and partial privatisation) and of
selective, public sector, infrastructure and private
sector incentive oriented state policy interventions, the
basic doctrine of the Report is that of economic (and
political) neo-liberalism. Access to basic needs,
elimination of absolute poverty and distribution are
taken off the Agenda. They are treated, at best, as the
by-products of maximising growth by selective
allocation of resources to areas and actors with high
short-term output potential and over-riding con-
centration on (also short-term?) profitability. From
this perspective closer integration of SSA's domestic
economies (already among the world's most open in
terms of import to GDP ratios) into the world
economy is seen as self-evidently desirable, because of
the poor growth prospects for the major industrial
economies and for international trade. The assertion
[p 1] that Agenda builds on the Lagos Plan of Action
[OAU 1980], which calls for SSA national and
regional integration and relatively less dependence on
an international economic environment, is with the
exception of the Report's support to regional
integration [pp 118-19] simply not accurate; the
reverse would be nearer the truth.
Is the Agenda Important?
These four characteristics of the Report outlined
above are not all of a kind. The first three raise
questions as to completeness, consistency and direct
applicability to specific cases (a doubt the Report
4i is flot to say that the Bank was either alone, careless or
ill-intentioned in cases of advice which have come unstuck. One
co-author must acknowledge having supported such Bank advice in
a number of cases he now perceives as errors (cg cutting Tanzanian
grower prices for maize in the early 1970s, selecting tea and tobacco
as 'growth pole' crops). Nor, indeed, is it to argue that the Bank
necessarily has a worse record than other sources of advice. But it
has been influential and in a number of cases influential in securing
the adoption of policies, the creation of institutions and the
implementation of projects now rightly criticised (often, though not
always, by the Bank).
occasionally - eg on pv - shares), but not
necessarily as to the overall sweep of the data, analysis
and conclusions. Their greatest damage may lie in the
possibility of preventing African and other critics
reading and reflecting without a bias against the
proposals because of their tone and style of
presentation. The fourth is different. Economic neo-
liberalism as a credo (as opposed to a number of the
measures contained in neo-liberal programmes) is
contentious analytically, disputed empirically and
ultimately accepted or rejected on normative, self-
interest, and theological rather than pragmatic, public
interest, and programmatic grounds.5
None of these comments mean that the Report is
unimportant, or that it should or can be overlooked. It
rests on a major data collection exercise. Its
presentation of the 1960-79 economic history of Africa
is a serious attempt at description and analysis. It has a
central organising economic model linked to a
political economic ideology of some real power and
some past and present capacity to perform. It is the
only major general policy-oriented analysis of SSA's
economic crises, and what might be done about them.
The Lagos Plan [OAU 1980] is not short-term, nor
detailed in terms of policy orientation. African
national strategy studies are - by definition - not
regional, and rarely present overall historical and
political economic perspectives explicitly.6 Any major
set of World Bank proposals backed by its influence,
technical capacity, funds and influence on other
sources of finance will have a significant impact on
events. This is especially likely in the case of this
Report, which is directed to the group of countries
which are economically weakest, currently most
dependent on external resource transfers, and
historically most disposed to accept (or least able to
reject?) external advice backed by economic influence.
Whatever academic and African official analysts think
of it, Accelerated Development will be a substantial
force for good, for evil, or - more probably - for a
mixture of both.
The main body of this Bulletin consists of a more
detailed examination of selected key themes and
sectors from the Report. What follows here is a brief
This is, of course, true of any broad political economic perspective
and of overall strategies derived from it. The same comment could
be made about Marxian, pragmatic welfare capitalist (cg Keynesian
or Brandtian) and neo-social democratic (cg basic needs)
perspectives, althougl1 in these the public interest (or externalities
surrounding self interest) have greater weight than in iwo-liberalism.
African critics may - with a not inconsiderable degree of fairness
- suggest that they are also viewed with reservations
internationally (and even domestically within Africa) precisely
because they are African. Whether this is based on a variant of 'if
you're so smart why aren't you rich?', on cultural or racial prejudice,
or simply because Africans, like women, are often 'invisible' to
many analysts and administrators, is less clear, and probably varies
from case to case.
resumé of its overall analytical presentation and of its
prescriptions for action.
Descriptive and analytical foci
Four principal themes link the Report's empirical
evidence, descriptive examples and analysis:
First, SSA economies (on most criteria) performed
only moderately well in the 1960s and much worse in
the 1970s. Prospects for the 1980s are even bleaker.
Indeed, a decline in per capita GDP is likely on present
trends for the 24 low income countries;
Second, the world economic environment for SSA
in the 1970s was mixed - with some very negative
shock impacts - but will be less favourable in the
1980s. African governments must adjust policies to
this bleaker climate and capture the opportunities of
comparative advantage-based, export oriented growth,
which most of them failed to do in the 1970s;
Third, SSA performance in respect to overall
economic and export growth is significantly worse
than that of other Third World regions and
deteriorated more sharply in the 1970s. While part of
this may be structural - eg on export mix, excluding
oil, dominated by commodities with low global
demand growth - much of it is not - eg decline in
share of world markets - for most main exports in the
l970s; after a mixed, but on balance, positive
performance on this count in the 1960s;
Fourth, the basic cause of deteriorating SSA
economic performance lies in African economic policy
and practice. Policies have been inward-looking
(biased against exports), elitist (interventionist and
overextended), inconsistent in formulation and
unsatisfactory in management, biased against agri-
culture and against the private sector. In particular,
overvalued exchange rates, quantitative trade restric-
tions, excessive government spending and lack of
incentives have hampered economic growth.
Each of these descriptions/lines of argument contains
very substantial elements of truth, and a good deal of
common ground among the Report's authors and
advocates on the one hand, and sceptics or critics on
the other. None, however, is quite as clearcut and
simple as the Agenda seems to suggest.
First, growth performance - while generally
unimpressive - has been very diverse among
countries and over time. In 1977-78 (je before the
'second oil crisis') the general impression was of
sustainable recovery to 1960s -early 1970s growth
levels after weathering the 1973-75 crisis.
Second, while the need to adjust to a worsened external
setting is unquestionable, the Report arguably




performance, especially in 1979 (and afortiori since).
This is relevant in assessing how much of the worsened
performance (and prospects) is related to basically
unsound policies; how much to policies overtaken by
events; and how much to the lags accompanying new
policies, or to accelerating external shocks swamping
policy responses.
Third, taken as a region, SSA has the worst 1970s
growth performance absolutely and relative to other
regions. The same is true for 'low income countries' (as
defined by the Bank). However, within the 'least
developed' and 'landlocked' categories (as defined by
the UN) the African economies, which are a majority
in both groups and comprise a majority of SSA
countries, on balance have somewhat above average
performance.
Fourth, the fact that a number of policy and
management errors classifiable in each of the
categories cited do exist, proves neither the generality
of these failings, nor that the Report's categorisation is
the only possible one. For example, one could argue
on the evidence that inadequate and inadequately
coordinated state policy - especially in respect to
exports - and too liberal and too unselective use of
credit licensing of imports were key mistakes, rather
than too much government and too many barriers to
imports. Similarly, the government expenditure levels
and growth rates relative to GDP do not correlate with
economic performance [as the Report admits on p 36].
Further, a substantial number of SSA economies
adjusted their policies promptly to meet the 1973-75
crisis, and achieved rapid recoveries of growth and
external balance up to the 1979 'second oil crisis'. This
casts some doubt on any interpretation of overall
policy weaknesses as the central underlying cause.
Finally, policies in African states vary rather more
widely than the Report seems to recognise, but
performance on purely economic criteria (as opposed
to distributional and access to public services tests)
Mining is critical to exports, employment and government revenue in several African economies - and has fared badly since 1975. (Mufilira
copper mine, Zambia)
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does not seem to correlate at all closely with these
differences.
None of this alters the need for clearer priorities, more
effective coordination, economy of scarce resources,
or the need to adjust to a nastier world than that of the
1960s or even the l970s. In particular it does not alter
the fact that during 1976-78 many SSA economies
wrongly believed (as did the OECD and the World
Bank) that the international economy was returning to
early 1970s patterns and trends. However, questions
do arise as to what the basic nature of policy errors and
the appropriate changes to be made are.
Patterns of Prescriptions
The Agenda contains a positive forest of proposals
which vary in terms of generality, individual
importance and their interaction with other proposals.
A number are fairly clearly desirable on almost any
criteria; others are either generally debatable or
relevant to certain contexts, but not to others. A clear
set of priorities - below the very general level - and a
coherent presentation of structure, interrelationship
and consistency are harder to find in the Report. The
trees do, in this case, tend to conceal the parameters of
the forest. However, using repeated references and the
degree of stress placed on cases cited, ten clusters
appear to dominate the proposals for action.
First, that there should be less (or at least, less
expansion of) state activity in traditional areas, with
the exception of economic infrastructure to serve the
private sector. In the case of basic services, universal
free access is at least implicitly rejected while more
privatisation of health and education, and more user
charges for all services (somewhat incongruously
African miners engage in arduous work for quite limited rewards.
(Mozambican miner)
packaged as part of an appeal for participation by
local communities in decision-taking) are stressed.
Related to the cutback in state activity is the second
focus: curtailment of parastatal (especially directly
productive) activity in favour of dynamic, flexible
private sector entrepreneurs. Given the long list of
debacles cited, it is not clear why reform, consolidation
and reduction of roles - enforced by free competition
- rather than wholesale denationalisation, is
advocated. However, the number of specific proposals
for privatisation (from drugs and seeds to basic
foodstuffs) and the deep conviction that the private
sector can always outcompete the public, may add up
to the same thing.
Third is greater emphasis on export expansion, linked
to agriculture as a means of raising peasant earnings
and foreign exchange, and to industry as a means of
increasing competitive tests of efficiency and laying a
basis for medium-term diversification of exports. This
emphasis is not simply a pragmatic response to the
appalling imbalance of payments crisis confronting
most SSA economies, with exports in a majority of
cases covering less than two-thirds of imports. Rather,
it is part of a generalfourth theme for more integration
into the world market on the basis of short-run
comparative advantage unhampered by government
restrictions.
Fffth, as a necessary corollary to the external
integration prescriptions, is a call for reduced
emphasis on self-sufficiency, apparently in food
(although the Report appears equivocal on this) and
certainly in manufactures. Protection is seen as
demonstrating inefficiency, and arguments about
building up new long-term comparative advantage;
insuring against global economic uncertainties; or
utilising otherwise totally unemployed resources
('some production is better than none') as quibbles or
rationalisations of inefficiency. The need for incentives
to raise the levels and alter the make-up of production
is the sixth important theme. Price incentives and
market forces to set them are given primacy. Non-
economic incentives are specifically put to one side as
somehow beyond development analysts' proper
concerns (or perhaps merely their knowledge?).
Certain other economic incentives (eg actual buyers,
inputs, goods to buy, transport) are also, quite rightly,
stressed, albeit perhaps not enough relative to price.
Seventh, the need for more middle and high-level
trained personnel (to provide greater 'technical
expertise') is stressed. Somewhat oddly, given the
proposals on government spending cuts, so is the need
for more primary education. In addition to
personpower, the eighth focus is knowledge and data
(ie applied research, financial reports and statistics),
which are cited as critical areas both for accelerated
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growth, and for more selectivity and simplification to
speed up the availability of critical technological
breakthroughs and data to manage operations,
monitor performance and prepare policies.
Ninth, the need to set priorities, articulate policies and
programmes from them in a consistent manner,
coordinate implementation and review and allocate
resources in accordance with the coordinated priority,
from policy to project package, is heavily stressed at
several points. Surprisingly, its own articulation seems
rather vague and fragmentary, and to betray a certain
lack of first-hand knowledge of policy and decision-
taking practice in SSA (or almost anywhere else).
Finally, the necessity of more external donor
involvement is made the subject of an entire chapter,
plus references elsewhere. Concessional financial
flows should be doubled, made more flexible and
related more to policies and less to projects. Aid
should be backed by policy involvement de facto or de
jure in policy/programme compacts like Bank
Structural Adjustment, and IMF stabilisation pro-
grammes. These are preferably to be coordinated by
the Bank and directed only to countries accepting the
Agenda.
Acceptance (merited in many cases) or rejection (also
merited in some)7 of specific proposals is different
from and - at least in the Report's own terms -
secondary to consideration of the merits and
limitations of the main clusters. If these are accepted,
most of the specific proposals follow. If they are
rejected, the Agenda requires basic revision even if
many components taken separately remain the same.
First, it is clear that most SSA states must live more
frugally. This may, however, entail raising more taxes
and using revenue more effectively, rather than cutting
back on functions which are already at dangerously
low levels from both economic and social points of
view. The bland abstraction from distribution issues
and the failure to specify realistically who else could,
and would, provide which services for whom, is
breathtaking. This applies also to the second cluster
relating to public enterprises - whose actual
performance is far more varied than is suggested in the
Report, and by no means always inferior to that of the
private sector. In many cases the only plausible answer
is - private foreign enterprise. Perhaps deliberately,
the reduced roles posited for public enterprise (eg
buyer and seller of last resort and guarantor of inter-
year supplies in basic foods) are by their nature loss-
making, and would presumably be used as a basis for
This is hardly a severe criticism - any list of about 500 specific
proposals will contain some which are not fully thought out, subject
to negative side effects, impracticable, eccentric or even dotty.
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subsequent criticisms of their 'efficiency' (defined in
enterprise profit terms).
The third cluster - increased priority to exports - is
valid. Many African countries have no coherent
export strategy, nor policy and programme arti-
culation to implement one.8 The problem is how? The
targets set in the Report are not feasible on the basis of
present or identified future export mixes. Neither
growth in primary product demand nor price elasticity
data, nor the limits of the past and of the new
protectionism to neo-NICery allow any other
conclusion. In any event, the need for more exports
does not necessarily lead to the fourth theme, advocacy
of a free trade/unhampered comparative advantage
model. Africa is objectively the most (and most
unilaterally dependent) integrated region in the world
economy. Historically, escape from low level, free
trading dependence has normally involved selective,
partial withdrawal and intervention to promote
exports at least partly based on different, developed
comparative advantage, as in Japan and South Korea.
Given the poor export prospects; the historic record of
new export bases - especially in manufacturing -
being built-up behind protective barriers; and the
present global level of excess capacity, which suggests
that deprotection would release resources to unem-
ployment, thefifth cluster of reduced self-reliance is at
best risky and at worst a recipe for mass starvation.
This is in no way to deny that many inefficiencies are
committed and many special pleadings rationalised
(not least by, and on behalf of, the foreign private
sector as in Kenyan and Ivoirienne textiles) in the
name of risk avoidance and long-term development.
These should be reduced (or rooted out), but their
existence does not prove that Japan was wrong. Nor
does it reverse the fact that import liberalisation and
attempts to shift industry and agriculture toward
global competitiveness (as advised by the Bank)
tripled Mexico's ratio of imports to GDP; sharply
increased food deficits; and played a central role in
precipitating the present crisis. More incentives to
produce (and to produce products with plausible
domestic or export markets) are needed, as stressed in
the sixth cluster. Whether the free market - especially
in conditions of massive imperfection, severe crisis
and generalised restrictive practices as in SSA today -
'A possibly extreme, but hardly unique, example is Tanzania which
had developed fairly clear and coordinated priorities with some
articulation to policies and programmes in most other sectors but
had no serious strategy for exports until 1980-81. Prior to that, a
clutter of uncoordinated micro-initiatives, projections based on
estimating future results not seeking to alter or manage them and
occasional partial sectora! programmes officially endorsed but not
backed by political prioretisation, policies or resource allocations
contrasted oddly with very difficult approaches to credit and foreign
exchange management, industrial development, expansion of basic
services or even reduction of economic inequality.
an provide economic incentives without market
management oriented state intervention is a different
question. So is the exclusion of many apparently
relevant incentives, for example, access to health and
education, reduction of time spent gathering fuel and
water.
The seventh and eighth clusters are clearly broadly
correct - more educated personpower, more
applicable knowledge and reasonably accurate data
more promptly are priorities. Here it is the micro
proposals which seem rather ill thought through.
Middle level personpower - usually scarcer in SSA
than high level9 - is not treated systematically and the
accounting cadre (a sine qua non for effective
Wood gathering and water carrying are a major burden on African
women's time and health. Appropriate improvements have high
economic incentive as well as human impact on rural communities.
(Women wood carriers in Ghana and village water project in
Tanzania)
enterprise and for timely evaluation and policy
reform) is not cited as a special priority.
The ninth cluster of clearer strategic priorities more
coherently articulated, coordinated and backed by
resource allocations is vital. This is true whatever
agenda any African state adopts. To plan is to choose
and so is to manage. The fact that the same criticism
applies to almost all states whether capitalist
This is sometimes disguised by the fact that senior personnel have to
do their own middle level work (or fail to function because it is not
done) which often gives an outsider the impression that the gap is at
or near the top, not in the middle of the continuum from unskilled
worker to senior manager.
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industrial, socialist industrial or developing, does not
alter this, although expectations may be tempered.
As to the final cluster and external cooperation,
differentiation is needed. The case for flexibility (made
at least equally cogently, incidentally, by several SSA
countries and by UNCTAD prior to the Report) is
compelling and is an area in which progress should be
possible. The doubling of real concessional finance
flows to Africa over the 1980s may be desirable but it
will not happen, as the Bank must recognise.'0 The
proposal for greater donor policy involvement would
be desirable if donors listened to and learned from the
African side more; were less ready to assert
unchallengable wisdom (and to seek to enforce it); and
view past mistakes with more humility. These
characteristics are not very evident in the Report. As
for reorganising bilateral aid around core Bank and
Fund programmes, views on that will hinge largely on
the readers' views as to the accuracy, practicability,
political acceptability and human desirability of their
increasingly interlinked world views. However, even
supporters of those world views may doubt whether
the Bank's apparent aspiration to become SSA's (and
the Third World's) planning ministry and Platonic
Guardians is in its own best interests or anyone else's.
From General to Sectoral and Case Study
Many of these points have been drawn from and are
elaborated further in the series of more specialised
examinations of particular aspects of the Accelerated
Development Report which made up this issue of the
Bulletin.
Philip Daniel examines the overall reformulation of
Bank approaches to development and its central
instrumental focus for ensuring that these approaches
are implemented in SSA. He recognises the
seriousness and importance of the Report as a
contribution to discussion and endorses the moves
toward advocacy of greater flexibility and overall
coherence in concessional resource transfers. Never-
theless he sees a danger of structural adjustment loans
becoming a means for fitting diverse economies to a
procrustean bed many of whose components appear
to be neither so clearly the right ones nor so generally
applicable as the Report seems to believe.
Manfred Bienefeld characterises Accelerated Develop-
ment as a reassertion of the virtues of market forces in
° There is every reason for the Bank to argue the case for increased
concessional finance even when jrospects are bleak - at the Worst it
may help limit cuts in real transfer levels. The problem is that the
Report appears to hold out these desirable levels as attainable and a
basis for planning - precisely the type of unreal targetry and
allocation of unreal resources the Bank (rightly) criticises as
indulged in by many SSA states.
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strikingly evangelistic and simplistic tones. He queries
its interpretation of the Asian NIC success stories
which he sees as owing much to detailed, persuasive
state intervention, and stresses the risks of close
integration into a highly unstable world economy
characterised by stagnation and unemployment. In
addition, he questions the past record of external
advice in Africa and asks how many decisions
regarded as wrong in retrospect could have been
recognised as such before the crises of 1973-75 and
1979 to date.
Christopher Co/dough reviews the evidence on the
scale and effectiveness of government activity in
Africa. He finds expenditure to be no higher relative to
GDP than elsewhere, and viable alternatives to state
action (apart from foreign firms) to be lacking in many
cases. The Agenda items on privatisation and charges
for basic services raise both distributional and
efficiency questions which the Report does not face
squarely.
Reginald Green reviews the Report's analysis of and
prescriptions for the faltering core agricultural sectors
of most SSA economies. While identifying a broad
area of common ground, he questions both the
sweeping nature of some generalisations and the
balance of emphasis among proposed remedies. In
particular he queries the practicability of raising real
purchasing power per unit of agricultural output, and
the relatively low emphasis placed on other material
incentives which may often be at least as critical. He
warns against the assumption that there are clear,
known, directly applicable answers to many of the
very real problems posed, and cites the rather mixed
record of external expert advice when acted on by SSA
states.
Martin Godfrey looks at empirical issues behind the
export oriented strategy proposals and finds the
targets to be unattainable and the strategy flawed. The
proposed agricultural output targets, if achieved for
the region, would probably depress prices so much as
to reduce earnings. The industrial export targets
cannot be met in the 1980s because African industries
have not had the firm, protected, home market based,
several decade long pre-export period that has
characterised most late entrants into the manufactured
exports market. Nor would trade liberalisation now
help build such a base; it would rather cause general
de-industrialisation.
Charles Harvey reviews the 1970-8 1 economic policy
and performance of Malawi, a state usually believed to
have followed the type of approach advocated in the
Report and, thereby, to have avoided economic crises.
He finds that the keys to its 1970s economic and export
growth were the systematic erosion of real wages and
prices paid to smaliholders, and the use of marketing
board surpluses and bank lending to expand estate
agriculture. The current account balance, has
deteriorated over the decade - very sharply since
1978 - while both GDP and export growth have
declined to near stagnation. In addition the recurrent
budget has, for the first time, gone into unmanageable
deficit. Nevertheless Malawi has maintained basic
food self-sufficiency. Overall the problems and
prospects are so similar to those of other African
countries that some questions are raised as to how
adequate - or even viable in the long run - the
Agenda's proposals are.
Stephany Grffith-Jones reflects on the Report's
probable results if implemented, in the light of Chile's
experience following the implementation of what she
sees as a broadly similar political economic world
view. The implications are rather daunting as they
include a sharp initial fall in output; substantial
permanent destruction of large sub-sectors of industry
and agriculture; higher unemployment, and worsened
income distribution; no sustained recovery into rapid
growth; recurrent external balance crises; and a need
for sustained repression to hold the economic model's
key policies in place.
Fertility, Women and the Agenda for Action
The Accelerated Development Report's treatment of
population growth (ie its reduction) and of women in
this and a more general context, is difficult to integrate
into its general analytical themes and prescriptive
clusters. Neither of these two interrelated questions is
the topic of a paper in this Bulletin, but each requires
attention.
The Report clearly includes reducing population
growth as a crucial long term goal. While the
somewhat simplistic neo-Malthusian case presented
may grate on many readers, the argument that a 2.5 to
4 per cent annual increase in population would
increase resource requirements for basic service and
employment provision beyond those likely to be
covered through any probable rate of output growth,
is a compelling one.
What is less clear is the analysis of, or proposals for
achieving demographic transition! Apparently the
Report views this as an appropriate area for state
intervention until the process of 'modernisation' itself
takes over. Thus a number of rather secondary micro
proposals are advocated. The Report, however, fails
to address itself to the historic evidence that a decline
in the birth rate usually follows lower death rates
(especially infant mortality), which is related to more
assured food supplies, access to pure water and
education for the absolutely poor. The record suggests
that the Report's proposals for reduced emphasis on
basic services and its lack of explicit attention to
distribution (which would almost certainly be
worsened) or absolute poverty eradication (which
would take time) would swamp any direct attempts to
control fertility and prevent a decline in population
growth."
As is all too usual in works of economic analysis, even
when they do seek to articulate development targets
and policies, women are semi-invisible and fragmented
in the Report. They have not disappeared from view
altogether, however. The education of women is
recognised as a means of reducing population growth
and of reducing the burden of household work (eg
water and fuel collection, food processing). The latter
is seen to be critical to raising agricultural production
(though this point is not made in the chapter on
agriculture).
These fragmentary references are not, however,
related to the main body of argument. Overall the low
priority attached to basic services, and proposals to
introduce more charges for those that exist, run
contrary to facilitating the contributions to develop-
ment expected of women. There is no serious analysis
of the specific roles women play in African economic
structures - a defect which is particularly serious in
respect to agriculture. The vision of the smallholder as
'African economic man' is simplistic. Even a coherent
presentation of 'African economic woman' would,
however, be welcome on analytical and operational as
well as normative grounds.
A Conclusion Advocating Dialogue
The preceding view may seem highly critical. It is
meant to be. Accelerated Development's political
economic world view is incomplete, contentious and
flawed. Therefore, its Agenda is not, taken by itself, a
safe guide for action. Further, the Report's overly self
confident style and tendency to instruct, rather than
inform or advise, Africans and African leaders does
not appear to be consistent either with its endorsement
of participation, or with the reality that only Africans
are primarily concerned with the well-being of Africa.
They have the right to take basic decisions about their
own destiny and can implement any agenda, whatever
the logical force or external pressures toward its verbal
acceptance may be.
° It is too alarmïst and too cynical to suggest that they might raise
mortality rates enoguh to cause African populations to revert to a
high birth and death rate/low population growth pattern. In any
event that could hardly be termed development, accelerated or
otherwise.
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However, there is no intention to write off Accelerated
Development as trivial, nor to fail to recognise the
substantial validity of much of its analysis, many of its
criticisms and a number of its proposals. It should not
be denied its rightful status as a seriously researched
and argued contribution to the dialogue on how most
SSA states have sunk into economic stagnation or
regression and what steps are necessary to halt these
trends, consolidate a base for reversing them and
begin to forge a new development dynamic. To do so
would be either even more rigidly ideological than
parts of the Report are, pedantically captious or blind.
A serious contribution to dialogue deserves a serious
analysis. Because the Report is the first overall
regional contribution, this is especially true in its case.
Such a critique is the first step toward finding common
ground, identifying areas of empirical or practical
disagreement (at least in principle resolvable by re-
examination of data and by dialogue), highlighting
lo
areas of risk and uncertainty and isolating areas in
which the divergencies are on basic goods and value
(in respect to which dialogue may identify costs and
trade-offs as well as narrow divergencies but no
universal, objective 'right' or 'wrong' answers exist). It
is toward such a dialogue that this Bulletin seeks to
contribute. Only after that stage can the process of
modification, consideration of alternative overall
approaches, evaluation of individual country strategies
and moves towards medium term action be conducted
on an informed basis. While some of the criticisms of
the Agenda for Action in this Bulletin do imply
alternative proposals, there is no attempt to present a
systematic 'counter report'. To seek to do so would be
presumptuous, premature and inappropriate, not
least because the bulk of formal alternative proposals
and, especially, of material action programmes should
be the contribution of Africans in Africa - and
preferably not just in offices in capital cities - not of
Europeans in Europe - especially in well equipped
universities.
